Is Isis Really Defeated?: The Future of Global Islamist Terrorism

By Marcel Thompson ‘22

At the end of the 20th century, global Islamist terrorism developed through the emergence of radical religious groups during periods of political crisis and war. The most important group,  Al Qaeda, was created in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghan War in order to structure and finance mujahideen forces in their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Under the guidance of its extremist and anti-Western leader, the group eventually became a global terrorist organization that conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But the terrorist group progressively lost its power and influence with the retaliation of the United States in Afghanistan following 9/11 and Operation Neptune Spear, the raid that killed Bin Laden in May 2011.

Following the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the fallen generals of Saddam Hussein and Islamist theorists imprisoned together in the Persian Gulf gathered to develop the Islamic State of Iraq—after a previous version of the group created in 1999 had pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda—with the project of establishing a caliphate and therefore give radical Sunni Islam a clearly defined territory. Forged in the ashes of post-war Iraq and revolutionary Syria, throughout the past decade the organization has become the preeminent global Islamist terrorist group and established itself between Syria and Iraq by conquering cities like Mosul (Iraq) and Raqqa (Syria), thus becoming the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, before declaring its caliphate on July, 29, 2014. At the height of its power in 2015, ISIS boasted some 100,000 fighters, controlled a territory of 41,000 square miles in Iraq and Syria and large oil reserves, while developing a dangerous terrorist network that could strike in the heart of Europe and beyond through an increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet to recruit and radicalize people around the globe.

After a coalition led by the United States fought the Islamic State for the past four years through airstrikes and by helping rebel groups and Kurdish fighters on the ground, President Trump declared victory against ISIS on December 19, 2018 and announced the withdrawal of United States forces from Syria. In his 2019 State of the Union address, he claimed that all ISIS-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq had been liberated. Indeed, the group has been substantially weakened and no longer boasts the vast territory it violently conquered during the past five years. However, parallel to its withdrawal from Syria and Iraq, the United States must turn their attention to establishing a long-term counterterrorism strategy against ISIS. Some fear the United States exit from Syria marks the beginning of a post-American era in the Middle East. Past experiences of similar situations in Afghanistan after the Afghan-Soviet War and in Iraq after the Persian Gulf War revealed to be quite catastrophic on the long-term. Indeed, the void left by a retreating United States will have unforeseen repercussions in the region and potentially beyond. Despite the group’s loss of territory, the Islamic State’s campaign of violence through its highly-developed propaganda strategy still has a reach on certain people in the region. That means that the United States should still plan for the presence of U.S Armed Forces to address potential post-caliphate ISIS resurgence. 

Since Trump was sworn into office in January 2017, there has been multiple terrorist attacks across the West. From the United Kingdom—Manchester, Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park, Parsons Green—to Spain—Barcelona and the resort in Cambrils—and in France—where a radicalized ISIS sympathizer attacked a soldier at Orly airport—, among other countries, these were taking place in the West despite the progress being made in Syria against ISIS. Therefore, despite its territorial weakening, similar kind of isolated acts could eventually happen in a near future. The United States should address those risks by assessing how ISIS is likely to evolve. In this context, there are lessons to be drawn from the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War. Indeed, as the United States left the country in chaos after arming mujahideen with sophisticated American weaponry, the religious extremism of the Taliban and Al Qaeda took over the “wandering mujahedeen”—as theorized by Gina Bennet in her 2009 book National Security Mom—in search of a new reason to fight. The problem repeats itself today in a more extreme way as ISIS fighters come from all around the globe and are already indoctrinated by an anti-western and islamist ideology. Also, many children in the region have been raised through the chaos of the civil war and forced into islamist academy by ISIS to prepare their next generation of fighters. Therefore, even if forced out of Syria and Iraq, the jihadists will not disappear. 

In that context, other jihadist groups stand ready to take the place of ISIS and give its fighters a new group with a similar ideology to fight for. The most obvious candidate is Al Qaeda, divided in two major groups: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). With up to 20,000 fighters in Syria, up to 9,000 in Somalia, 5,000 in Libya, 4,000 in Yemen, and others in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Egypt, the dispersed but well-organized terrorist network is already undergoing a “resurrection” according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Despite losing their supremacy on global terrorism following 9/11, Bin Laden’s death, and the ascent of ISIS, Al Qaeda still exists and plans to attack the West after focusing for years in creating chaos in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) and the Sahel (Mali). This sudden resurgence is not only due to the decreasing power of ISIS, but also to the progressive change of leadership in the organization. 

While Ayman al-Zawahiri has led al-Qaeda since the death Osama bin Laden, his most probable successor is Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s favorite son. Similarly, to his father in 1991, Hamza has had his Saudi citizenship removed last February and, subsequently, a 1$ million reward put on his head. Letters discovered in the Abbottabad compound after Operation Neptune Spear show that Hamza had a close bond with his father and wanted to follow in his footsteps. His father appeared to be preparing him for a leadership role. Since May 2011, Hamza has sworn revenge for his father's death. “If you think that the crime you perpetrated in Abbottabad has gone by with no reckoning, you are wrong,” he warned in a recording. He is now emerging as a leader of the terrorist organization founded by his father after issuing a series of exhortations to attack the West, and, due to his name, he has become an effective propaganda tool for Al Qaeda in order to attract new fighter and to rejuvenate the image of the organization. Al Qaeda is seemingly trying to capitalize on the end of ISIS caliphate to become once again the world's preeminent jihadist group. 

With the civil war in Syria coming to an end and the loss of their territory, ISIS fighters now find themselves in drift and seek a way to continue their terrorist actions. While many will attempt to infiltrate the West, the “wandering mujahedeen” may also seek another group to fight for. And with Al Qaeda finding a new figurehead through Hamza Bin Laden, these fighters might join the organization and, therefore, confirm its resurgence.

Works Cited

Oprysko, Caitlin. “White House Claims Victory in Freeing Syria from ISIS Control.” POLITICO, 22 Mar. 2019, www.politico.com/story/2019/03/22/donald-trump-isis-syria-1232488.

“(W)Archives: Wandering Mujahidin Menace?” War on the Rocks, 29 May 2014, warontherocks.com/2014/05/warchives-wandering-mujahidin-menace/.

Avagnina, Ben Farmer; Gianluca. “US Offers $1 Million Reward to Find Osama Bin Laden's Son.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 1 Mar. 2019, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/01/us-offers-1-million-reward-find-osama-bin-ladens-son/.