ISIS, Beheaded, Can Still Survive
On October 27th, President Trump announced the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi following a US commando raid in Syria. Baghdadi was the leader of the international terrorist group ISIS. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), often referred to as the Islamic State, is a self-proclaimed proto-state that has gained massive international attention since 2014 due to its capture of considerable territory in the Middle East, and its claiming of acts of terror around the globe, such as the Camp Speicher massacre in June 2014, the Paris attacks of November 2015, the Orlando nightclub shooting of June 2016, and the Sri Lanka bombings in April 2019, just to name a few of the most well known.
Trump was not shy in leveraging this achievement for all of its symbolic and emotional substance. In a nationally televised address, Trump vividly described Baghdadi’s death. “He died after running into a dead end tunnel, whimpering and crying and screaming all the way… He died like a dog. He died like a coward.” There has been speculation from various media outlets about Trump’s use of some degree of creative embellishment in this description. Trump also proclaimed, somewhat confusingly, that “at my direction, as Commander in Chief of the United States, we obliterated his caliphate one hundred percent,” then stating that “we will continue to pursue the remaining ISIS terrorists to their brutal end.''
Elucidating reality from Trump’s provocative rhetorical spin is an arduous task. Trump is touting this as a major defeat for ISIS, but the enduring effects of his death are still contentious among analysts. Many argue that Baghdadi’s death will not significantly hinder the Islamic State. The argument from this camp is that ISIS leadership power is highly decentralized, thus they can continue to function without its main leader. Small cells of members, dispersed widely throughout the world and held together by a vast media network, plan and carry out their own attacks, highlighting the dispersion of the organization. Furthermore, for the past few years, fearing his death, Baghdadi has kept himself isolated, leaving ISIS to operate largely without his supervision. Those who take this stance also point to the fact that recent ISIS propaganda has a central message that the movement is larger than any single person, and that it must continue regardless of leadership changes. Due to the precedent that these leaders of large terrorist organizations will almost certainly be targeted, the idea that Baghdadi would take precautions against his death to ensure the survival of ISIS makes sense
The killing of Baghdadi, unsurprisingly, has drawn comparisons to the killing of Osama bin Laden. Trump himself made the comparison, but apparently simply to state that Baghdadi’s death was more important that bin Laden’s. However, the more common use of this comparison is to point out that bin Laden’s death did not actually lead to the collapse of Al Qaeda. Similarly to the killing of Zarqawi before him, bin Laden’s death was followed by continued violence across the region that Al Qaeda occupied. If these two examples have taught us anything, it is that Baghdadi’s death should not appease concern for ISIS’s terroristic potential.
Nevertheless, Baghdadi was undoubtedly an important leader in the world of terrorism — many Islamic State members viewed him as the rightful leader of all Muslims worldwide. Some analysts point to this cultural prominence as a sign that Baghdadi’s death was a harmful blow to ISIS. They also argue that he was an exceptional propagandist and leader. Baghdadi was exceptionally good at facilitating overseas attacks, according to intelligence officials. This point is corroborated by the statistics— the vast number of attacks that have been claimed by ISIS in the past several years is hard to keep track of.
While the debate on the importance of Baghdadi’s death for ISIS continues, it is important to note that what will unfold in the region is largely dependent on foreign policy decisions there — from both the US and other relevant nations. The event of Baghdadi’s death is intertwined with the issue of Trump’s withdrawal of troops from northern Syria. It is unknown to what degree, if at all, Trump considered the Baghdadi mission when pulling out of Syria. From the apparent impulsivity and unthoughtfulness of the withdrawal, it does not seem that Trump factored this into this decision.
The main concern is that a US withdrawal from the region will lead to destabilization, leaving a power vacuum that will be filled by an ISIS reemergence. With the inevitable emergence of a new ISIS leader, US officials and policy analysts alike have insisted that the US must maintain a military presence in Syria in order to prevent ISIS from reemerging, as al Qaeda did after bin Laden was killed. While one should always be skeptical of a US official’s claim of necessary military action, it appears reasonable to solidify the gains made in controlling ISIS power in the region.
This issue inevitably is centered around the debate of U.S. interventionism. Some, while recognizing its disastrous execution, think that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria is the right thing to do. It is, after all, technically an illegal occupation. However, there are ways to end US military occupation in the region without inciting further destabilization. We can ridicule the withdrawal without necessarily discounting the general policy of ending U.S. interventionism. (It should be noted that Trump, despite his rhetoric on the issue, is not interested in reeling in U.S. intervention in the Middle East.) Since May 2019, U.S. military presence in the Middle East has increased by 14,000 troops.
The reason that Trump’s withdrawal was so problematic is in its execution, not that reeling in US interventionism in the Middle East is a misguided policy in general. By suddenly deciding to pull US troops out of Syria, without providing some safeguard from another group, such as the UN or the Syrian government, the Kurds were left vulnerable to immediate Turkish assault—an opportunity that the Turkish did not pass on. Not only is this a disloyal abandonment of a loyal ally in the fight against ISIS (an ally that also gathered critical intel on Baghdadi’s position), but Kurdish forces are being drawn away from guarding approximately 11,000 ISIS prisoners detained in makeshift prisons in northern Syria. With around half of Kurdish forces drawn out to protect against the Kurdish assault, some ISIS prisoners have already escaped. This concern is so potent that Iraqi security forces have reinforced defenses along the Syrian border, fearing that escaped ISIS fighters will try to cross the border.
These complications show that ending US involvement in the Middle East, a laudable goal in itself, requires more than a spontaneous withdrawal. We have responsibilities to people in the region, especially due to our significant role in the process of its destabilization. While Trump has achieved the symbolic victory of killing the leader of the Islamic State, whether or not this is solidified into a real stabilization of the region is yet to be seen. To exaggerate the importance of Baghdadi’s death and to make rash foreign policy decisions in the region (Trump has done both) will only leave more space for the reemergence of ISIS.
Baker, Peter, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper. “ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says.” The New York Times, October 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/politics/isis-leader-al-baghdadi-dead.html.
Baker, Peter, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper. “ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says.” The New York Times, October 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/politics/isis-leader-al-baghdadi-dead.html.
Hubbard, Ben, Rukmini Callimachi, and Alissa J. Rubin. “Leader's Death Will Damage ISIS, but Not Destroy It.” The New York Times, October 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/isis-leader-dead-impact.html?action=click&module=Top Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
Baker, Peter, Eric Schmitt, and Helene Cooper. “ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says.” The New York Times, October 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/politics/isis-leader-al-baghdadi-dead.html.
Hubbard, Ben, Rukmini Callimachi, and Alissa J. Rubin. “Leader's Death Will Damage ISIS, but Not Destroy It.” The New York Times, October 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/isis-leader-dead-impact.html?action=click&module=Top Stories&pgtype=Homepage.
Barnes, Julian E., and Eric Schmitt. “Intelligence From Al-Baghdadi Raid, Including 2 Prisoners, Could Reveal Trove of ISIS Clues.” The New York Times, October 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/us/politics/baghdadi-raid-intelligence.html.
Clarke, and Colin P. “How the U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Provides a Boost to ISIS.” RAND Corporation, October 21, 2019. https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/10/how-the-us-withdrawal-from-syria-provides-a-boost-to.html.
Friedersdorf, Conor. “Trump's Middle East Policy Is a Fraud.” The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, October 15, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/trump-fool-us-middle-east/600010/.
Coles, Isabel, Jared Malsin, and Warren P. Strobel. “Death of Baghdadi Unlikely to End the Insurgency He Led.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, October 27, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/death-of-baghdadi-unlikely-to-end-the-insurgency-he-led-11572211479.