Haunting Protests in Chile: The Shadow of its Authoritarian Past

In October, a slight increase in the subway fare prompted high school students in Santiago, Chile, to jump turnstiles as part of the “#EvasionMasiva” movement. The violent response of the police force inspired protesters to take to the streets, calling for sweeping reform. President Sebastián Piñera, who has blamed organized criminal groups for violence, then declared a state of emergency and deployed the military into the city in order to keep the peace. In the tumult, there have been thousands of arrests, 19 deaths, hundreds injured, and 20 missing people. The deployment of the military and ensuing chaos has stirred unwelcome memories of former dictator Augusto Pinochet, whose far-right government murdered, tortured, and raped thousands of Chileans during the 1970s. Despite this tactic, Piñera has since scrambled to find ways to placate protesters, which has resulted in him dismissing eight cabinet members and calling for pension reform and an increase in the minimum wage.2 

These demonstrations, of which some have become riotous, have been attributed to growing dissatisfaction with extreme inequality and disillusionment with the political process which is seen as unresponsive to the concerns of citizens. The increased subway fare, while seemingly insignificant, was viewed as emblematic of the elites’ indifference toward regular citizens. Tensions were inflamed by the Economy Minister Juan Andrés’ suggestion that workers leave their homes earlier to get to work to avoid rush-hour subway rates, in response to the criticism that more than 13 percent of the budgets of low-income families went toward transportation.2 Chile has long been seen as the “political and economic darling of Latin America,”4 but impressive growth has not shielded the government from criticism of a “yawning gap between the haves and have-nots.”4 Despite being the first Latin American country to join the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Chile has the greatest measure of inequality among member countries, and the income gap is 65 percent wider than the OECD average.3 Piñera’s administration has continued the tradition of a pro-growth economic agenda that is based in the 1980 Constitution, which has attracted investment and contributed to the burgeoning economy, but at the expense of social safety nets, pensions, and socioeconomic mobility.1 The Constitution, written while Pinochet was still in power, laid the groundwork for a “market-driven economic model that has privatized pensions, health and education.”2 Anger has also been directed at recent corruption scandals involving top government officials and businessmen, reaffirming the notion that elites are unconcerned with the common people.1 

Some have also cited disconnect between the Chilean public and the political process as catalysing civil unrest, as the country has the lowest rates of civic engagement in the OECD. In past decades, the percentage of citizens who identify with a political party has fallen precipitously from 80 percent to 19 percent, and a large majority see both political parties and the Congress as corrupt.5 Such skepticism regarding the integrity of national politics suggests both that sweeping economic changes are unlikely, and that Chile’s problems may not be simply partisan matters. While the current government is aligned to the right, the last four presidential terms have been held nonconsecutively by Piñera and Michelle Bachelet alone. Bachelet, while belonging to the left, is also seen as elite and out of touch by Chileans.


Widespread dissatisfaction with political processes and actors in Chile has its roots in Pinochet’s rule, as “the last vestiges of Chile’s dictatorship were never entirely rooted out, and the persistent influence of former authoritarian elites … is part of what is bringing protesters out on the streets today.”4 Though ostensibly democratizing during the 1990s, Pinochet remained the head of the military until 1998, and other politicians who were formerly members of the juntas still hold prominent political office.4 Many of those in power during the dictatorship have retained their power, and authoritarian dynamics have been reproduced in the new government. Specifically, lawmakers have sought to solidify historical institutions that benefit members of the old regime while fighting change that would disrupt established power structures.4 One such example is the prevention of tax and labor reforms that would have otherwise threatened authoritarian power in the 1990s.4 Still, growing unrest suggests that these corrupt practices may be unsustainable, and the modest increase in subway fares may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back in this regard. Only time will tell whether Chile will be able to outgrow its authoritarian legacy, and whether Piñera’s calculated proposals will be sufficient to quell the tide of change.

Sources

Ernesto Londoño, “What You Need to Know About the Unrest in Chile,” The New York Times (The New York Times, October 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/americas/why-chile-protests.html.

 Daniel Borzutzky, “Chile Is in Danger of Repeating Its Past,” The New York Times (The New York Times, November 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/opinion/chile-is-in-danger-of-repeating-its-past.html.

 Sarah Jones, “What the Hell Is Going on in Chile? A Protester Explains.,” Intelligencer (Intelligencer, November 7, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/what-the-hell-is-going-on-in-chile-a-protester-explains.html.

 Michael Albertus and Mark Deming, “Pinochet Still Looms Large in Chilean Politics,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, November 5, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/05/chile-ongoing-protests-pinochet-dictatorship-looms-large/.

 Esteban Jadresic, “The Roots of Chile's Social Discontent,” Financial Times (Financial Times, November 8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/45dc28b8-9247-4d4b-8fcc-e90691d1a1d6.

 Christopher Sabatini and Anar Bata, “Latin America's Protests Are Likely to Fail,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/08/latin-americas-protests-are-likely-to-fail/.