France’s Françafrique Conundrum
France’s pre-colonial and post-colonial legacy has continued to bring about a diminishing, but still formidable position of power in their former colonies in Africa. These former colonies, often collectively known as Francafrique, have been strongly influenced economically and politically through heavy handed paternalistic interventions for the good part of 80 years. However, due to the advent of growing backlash, disgruntlement has recently come to a head with anti-French protests and violence spreading in the region. This has prompted French public discourse on three particular neo-colonial issues in regards to the region: firstly, the question of why France continues to maintain a 5,100 man standing military presence in Africa, second, why France still nominally controls the currency (CFA Franc) used by all their former colonies, and lastly criticism of France’s unethical raw resource extraction from the region. The most important factor tying the three together is military presence, increasingly because of potential conflicts of interest between French President Emmanuel Macron and France as an independent entity; specifically, in regards to personal gain or national security, respectively. The question is, what are France’s and Macron’s current options? What may be their motivations in making them? Considering Francophone Africa has now been left battered and unstabilized by constant meddling and economic exploitation, it is unable to have a say for itself. Therefore, making French actor’s interests all the more salient in considering whether to do away with or reduce French military presence, more so than the many French-made failed states of Africa.
Understanding long standing entangling interests are integral in elucidating what the future of French Africa will be. Emmanuel Macron as an individual actor and France as a state actor, while having similar interests broadly, may see things differently in regards to the situation in Francafrique. Macron’s primary interest in winning reelection hinges on being able to win the new burgeoning populist and anti-Islamic demographic in France, a sizable demographic that has come to comprise 27% of the French population. One of the core issues many populists and regular citizenry have come to care deeply about is that of Islam and Islamic terror. A survey conducted by the IFOP, indicates that 89% of respondents consider terrorism a high threat to France. Utilizing the current public opinion to his advantage, the situation in Francafrique could serve as a major political boon for Macron. Francafrique nations destabilized by constant French intervention have given rise to power vacuums and lawlessness in certain parts of their respective nations. Jihadist groups like ISIS and the Boko Haram have risen from the anarchy to fill the vacuums left by governments. A decisive defeat or even semi-victory in the area could go a long way in generating popular support for Macron, and would indicate to the public that he is taking French national security seriously. However, as many scholars have already noted, tactical or military defeat of Islamic terrorism does little to quell the problem at the root. Furthermore, France as a state actor lacks the incentive to maintain troops in Africa for three blatant reasons. French military exertions don’t necessarily need to be maintained considering American troop numbers exceed 7,000+ in Francafrique. Free riding on the coattails of the Americans is an option, considering their primary mission is to fight terrorism in the region. Second, the Chinese have similar business interests in French Africa with their belt and road initiative, so French economic interests will be looked after indirectly. And finally, the largest dispute facing France and Francafrique is that of the creation of a new currency to replace the CFA Franc, and there is no military imperative required to solve it. Meaning, French military resources in Africa would be going to secure a platitude victory for the public, a complete waste from a state perspective. Thus, it’s these contextual conditions that solidify the tangibility of conflicting interests between the head of state and the state itself.
The situation at hand could entail cooperation in bargaining, as both Macron and France as a state entity only stand to gain from coordination to a degree, or maintain the status quo. If Macron decides to continue to station troops in Francafrique or increase military commitments in the region, there is a chance that there will be a tactical victory. However, if he decides to pull out, he stands to gain nothing from the action. In comparison, if France, as a state actor, unilaterally decides to pull out, then we would see the diversion of resources to fight the root of the Islamic terror problem rather than the expending of military resources gratuitously, this diversion being a better use of public goods (public goods referring to national defense in this case). Of course, if the status quo remains, then they would see no net benefit for France in a broader security context. Grounds to cooperate do exist, but both actors involved have varying amounts of leverage that can be used for bargaining. Macron, having public opinion and also public memory of recent terror attacks fresh in the French psyche, has the ability to set the agenda amongst his base, in order to mobilize support for his cause. He further has the benefit of being the spokesperson of the nation first and foremost, and can coerce action in the region with inflammatory posturing to the citizens of France, in other words tie his hands. That being said, France as the state is not without its options as well. France’s leverage really lies in its democratic principles and domestic institutions. France has a parliamentary system that has the ability to prevent rash military action by the President and can censure actions publicly. Moreover, only the French parliament can authorize an increase in military commitments to fight terrorism. It is the leverage, in bargaining, that helps to make or break cases.
In conclusion, Macron’s strong interest in reelection and France’s overarching interest in security and welfare of France threatens the balance of power. That being said, room for cooperation exists and a willingness to bargain is the only necessary requirement for beneficial settlement.
Sources:
Haddad, Benjamin. “France's War on Islamism Isn't Populism. It's Reality.” Foreign Policy, January 1, 3968. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/03/frances-war-on-islamism-isnt-populism-its-reality/.
Munshi, Neil. “Why Macron's Attempt to Reset French Ties to Africa Has Hit Trouble.” Financial Times. Financial Times, October 27, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/cea9cdd9-c500-41bc-a2ae-2e4c01eaf2e8.
Statista Research Department. “Populist Vote Share in Europe 2018.” Statista, July 29, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/883893/populism-in-europe/.
UnitedEditor. “Failure Francafrique: Why France Is Losing Influence in Africa.” United World International. United World International, February 15, 2020. https://unitedworldint.com/7975-failure-francafrique-why-france-is-losing-influence-in-africa/.